Evaluation of Cybersecurity Threats on Smart Metering System by Tweneboah-Koduah, Samuel et al.
Page 1 of 7 
 
Evaluation of cybersecurity threats on Smart Metering System 
1Samuel Tweneboah-Koduah; 2Anthony K. Tsetse; 3Julius Azasoo; 4Barbara Endicott-Popovsky 
1 School of Engineering and Science, Aalborg University, Denmark 
2 Dept. of Computer Science, Northern Kentucky University, Griffin Hall 463, Highland Heights, KY  41099 
3 Department of Computer & Immersive Technologies, University of Northampton, UK 
Julius.Azasoo@northampton.ac.uk; School of Technology (SOT), GIMPA, Ghana jazasoo@gimpa.edu.gh 
4 Center for Information Assurance and Cybersecurity in Education 
Box 358523, Husky Hall 10909 NE 185th Street, Room HH 1439, Bothell, WA 98011-8246 
 
 
Abstract 
Smart metering has emerged as the next-generation of 
energy distribution, consumption, and monitoring 
systems via the convergence of power engineering and 
information and communication technology (ICT) 
integration otherwise known as smart grid systems. 
While the innovation is advancing the future power 
generation, distribution, energy consumption 
information delivery, the success of the platform is 
positively correlated to the successful integration and 
stability of technologies upon which the system is built. 
Nonetheless, the rising trend of cybersecurity attacks on 
cyber infrastructure and its dependent systems coupled 
with the systems inherent vulnerabilities present a 
source of concern not only to the vendors but also the 
consumers. These security concerns need to be 
addressed in order to increase consumer confidence so 
as to ensure greatest adoption and success of smart 
metering. In this paper, we present a functional 
communication architecture of the smart metering 
system. Following that, we demonstrate and discuss the 
taxonomy of smart metering common vulnerabilities 
exposure, upon which sophisticated threats can 
capitalize. We then introduce countermeasure 
techniques, whose integration is considered pivotal for 
achieving security protection against existing and future 
sophisticated attacks on smart metering systems.  
Keywords  
Smart metering infrastructure, smart grid, cybersecurity 
threats, energy management, ICT integration 
1.0 Introduction 
The modernization of the modern power grid  systems 
otherwise known as the smart grid has been developed 
for the purpose of enabling bidirectional flows of 
metering information in order to provide consumers 
with diverse choices for how, when, and how much 
electricity they use. Integrated within the smart grid 
infrastructure setup is smart metering which core 
objective is to automate the monitoring of consumers’ 
power consumption, as well as the billing and 
accounting. Smart metering infrastructure also known 
as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), is the core 
component in smart grid infrastructure systems. The 
functional architecture represents an automated two-
way communication between a smart utility meter and a 
utility producer [1]. The metering system monitors 
consumers’ power consumption by collecting 
information on such consumption and communicating 
such information back to the utility company for load 
monitoring and billing [1].  
Additionally, smart metering infrastructure aims at 
providing better monitoring of power consumption, and 
an efficient and more transparent billing system. Thus, 
the utility providers are able to apply different prices 
for power consumption based on the time of day and 
season [2]. By design, smart metering enables 
consumers to access their own real-time use of power 
consumption information through a web interface and 
mobile app service. These goals could not have been 
achieved and realized without the integration of 
communication technology infrastructure required to 
gather, assemble, and synthesize data provided by smart 
meters and other interconnected components. 
Smart Metering (SM) has gradually become an interest 
to both research and industrial communities most 
importantly to utility companies, energy regulators, 
energy distribution vendors as well as energy 
conservation societies [3]. The adoption and use of 
smart metering is advancing in recent times due to the 
ability to integrate information and communication 
technologies with the development of energy 
infrastructure systems. Notwithstanding, the recent 
upsurge in cyber attacks against critical infrastructure 
systems threaten the smooth functioning of a smart 
metering infrastructure development and the electric 
grid as a whole. In this paper, we assess cybersecurity 
issues in smart metering infrastructure. Our goal is to 
provide an initial step to classify the system’s inherent 
vulnerabilities and the potential security threats capable 
of exploiting these vulnerabilities. We evaluate this by 
demonstrating the feasibility and impact of various 
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threat vectors upon a smart metering communication 
infrastructure network. 
This paper is organized as follows. Beginning with this 
introduction, the next section reviews the state of the art 
of smart metering system. In Section III, smart metering 
functional architecture is presented. Section IV explores 
the evaluation of cyber cybersecurity challenges on 
smart metering. We discuss the study findings in 
section V and then conclude the paper in Section VI. 
2.0 Related studies 
As indicated earlier, the concept of smart metering has 
advanced in recent times due to the integration of 
information and communication technologies into 
energy development. Rinaldi classified such integration 
as cyber interdependency [4]. In a related study, 
Rinaldi, et al. argued that interdependencies in critical 
infrastructure systems give rise to functional and non-
functional challenges which do not exist in single 
infrastructural system [5]. Accordingly, Li et al, posit 
that smart metering is part of the smart grid 
infrastructure system and for that matter, security 
attacks may take place both in the physical space, as in 
the conventional power grid, as well as cyberspace as in 
any modern communication infrastructure network [2].  
Moreover, smart metering infrastructure system is often 
microprocessor-based, and usually, supports wireless 
connection for easy control and monitoring. Li et al. 
argue that smart meters are massively deployed as 
access points and in most cases connected to the 
Internet in order to engage customers in utility 
management. These access points, conversely, have 
become ideal portals for intrusions and malicious 
attacks [2]. Conversely, Li et al, maintain that the 
openness in the smart metering systems (to the public 
network) increases vulnerabilities in the grid thereby 
escalating sophisticated threat attacks on the system. In 
a related study, Flick and Morehouse claim that 
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure in general, and 
the electricity grid, in particular, has become the subject 
of increasing research interest both in academia and 
industry [6]. Contributing to this, Giani, et al., argue, 
the potential consequences of successful cyber attacks 
on the electric grid is staggering  [7]. They stated, smart 
metering which is part of a Smart Grid infrastructure 
system incorporates sensing, communication, and 
distributed control to accommodate renewable 
generation, electronic vehicle (EV) loads, storage, and 
many other technologies. These activities substantially 
increase actionable data transfers making the system 
more vulnerable to cyber attacks, thus, increasing the 
urgency of cybersecurity research for electric grids [7].  
Many recent papers have explored various aspects of 
cyber attacks on smart grid and smart metering systems. 
For instance, Yan et al, summarize possible 
vulnerabilities and cybersecurity requirements in smart 
grid communication systems and surveyed solutions 
capable of counteracting related cybersecurity threats 
[8]. Furthermore, a study by Wei et al. proposed a 
framework for protecting power grid automation 
systems against cyber attacks [9]. Their paper 
considered, among other things, integration with the 
existing legacy systems, desirable performance in terms 
of modularity, scalability, extendibility, and 
manageability, alignment to the “Roadmap to Secure 
Control Systems in the Energy Sector” and future 
intelligent power delivery systems [9]. Cleveland in [3] 
argued that while various AMI vendors and customers 
consider encryption as a security proof solution to the 
threats of cyber adversaries on AMIs, there are other 
potential cybersecurity challenges facing AMI systems. 
The challenges Cleveland identified include 
confidentiality, integrity, data availability and non-
repudiation. The issues of privacy, confidentiality, and 
data availability as cybersecurity threats against smart 
grid systems have also been discussed in the following 
studies [2], [10]- [14].  
3.0 Smart Metering Functional Architecture 
The future power grid has a tiered architecture to 
supply energy to consumers [15]. This modern energy 
infrastructure system starts from power generation 
which flows through transmission systems to 
distribution and eventually to the final consumer. A 
smart grid system strives to use and coordinate various 
generations, and production as well as the distribution 
mechanisms of the grid [15]. Smart metering 
infrastructure is the core component in a smart grid 
infrastructure system. Its functional architecture 
represents an automated two-way communication 
between a smart utility meter and a utility producer [1]. 
Smart meters identify power consumption by collecting 
information on such consumption and communicate the 
information back to the utility company for load 
monitoring and billing for accounting purposes [1]. By 
generalizing the structures in [15],  [2] and [1], we 
present functional smart metering architecture as 
illustrated in figure 1. The architecture consists of a 
micro-load management unit and its hardware 
subsystem which houses the various hardware 
components of the system. Each of the structures has its 
core components and functions explained below.   
i. Smart Meter: This is the core of a smart 
metering infrastructure setup. It acts as the main 
source of energy-related information or other 
metrological data and provides interval data for 
customer energy loads. 
ii. Smart Metering Communications Network: 
Like a traditional communication network, the 
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smart metering network provides a path for 
information flow within the grid.  
iii. Customer Gateway: This acts as the conduit 
between a smart metering network and the other 
smart devices in the grid or within the customer 
facilities, such as a Home Area Network (HAN) 
or the Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) 
Other components within the metering system include:  
iv. The Wide Area Network (WAN) Interface: 
It collects metering and control information 
from the Server systems and relays the 
readings and status of the meter to the server.  
v. The Home Area Network (HAN): This serves 
as the communication medium for device 
interface sensors, actuator/network relays, the 
In-Home Display (IHD) units, etc. This 
communication medium can be a single 
unidirectional or bidirectional or a 
combination of multiple technologies such as 
power line carrier (PLC), Ethernet, or wireless 
communication technologies (e.g. Z-Wave, 
Bluetooth, ZigBee, WiFi, RF mesh, and 
WLAN (802.11)).  
vi. The WAN gateway: This acts as the link 
between the metering Unit and the Micro-load 
metering information system to provide near 
real-time monitoring and control functions of 
the metering system and other auxiliary 
services, by providing access to the electrical 
utility companies and their consumers.  
The utility company gains access to the metering 
system through a computer interface directly connected 
to the server. Utility consumers are usually provided 
access to the metering system through the web and/or 
mobile application interface, giving consumers the 
ability to monitor real-time information about energy 
consumption and billing, as well as performing home 
automation activities using integrated mobile devices. 
 
Figure 1: Smart Metering Communication Architecture 
 
vii. The Home Area Network (HAN) Gateway: 
It provides a communication channel between 
the main metering unit and the micro-load 
controllers. As a result, the micro controllers 
and load management can be extended to an 
off-the-shelf micro-load meter for the use of 
Electric Vehicle (EV) charging systems and 
other energy consuming loads.  
viii. The Neighboring Area Network (NAN) 
Gateway:  Acts as the intermediary tier 
connecting multiple HANs collectively in the 
smart grid for the purpose of accumulating 
energy consumption information from 
households (the HANs), in a neighborhood 
and relay the data to the utility company [15] 
for billing and monitoring.   
The Metering Unit (MU) is the main control center for 
the smart metering functional architecture. In the 
absence of the HAN, the MU is able to monitor the 
amount of energy being consumed, as well as the ability 
to curtail electric energy to all energy consuming 
devices and appliances. Furthermore, the Micro-Load 
Metering Unit monitors and reads the consumptions of 
all the devices and appliances attached to the main 
meter (including Electric Vehicle Charging Terminals 
(EVCT) by providing granular consumption data for 
consumption analysis and predicting future energy 
consumption. The micro-load controller functions to 
cut-off or connects micro-loads to the main source of 
electricity via the metering unit. This functionality is 
directly linked to the direct load control (DLC) which 
enables consumers to respond to pricing signals or 
time-of-use through an application program interface 
(API) such as Web or Mobil App.   
4.0 Cybersecurity Challenges in Smart 
Metering  
The conventional metering system is embedded with 
dedicated power devices, which are mostly integrated 
with control, monitoring and communication 
functionalities, using closed networks composed of 
predictable serial communication links. In contrast, 
smart metering decouples communication and control 
functionalities from power devices, and is modularized 
for the purposes of scalability and maintenance [2]. 
Moreover, smart metering core components are usually 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products from diverse 
vendors having unknown incompatibilities. 
Cybersecurity challenges of a smart metering system lie 
in the system’s inherent vulnerabilities which expose 
the infrastructure setup to various attacks. The sources 
of vulnerabilities may include the firmware, hardware 
architecture, system applications, as well as the network 
interface. Besides, the bi-directional communication 
link between the metering unit and the main gateway 
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leave the system open for network-related attacks and 
protocol failure. Other communication attacks include 
wireless scrambling, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle 
attacks, message modification and injection attacks. For 
example, IP-based devices are susceptible to IP 
misconfiguration and do exhibit nondeterministic 
behavior in terms of attack. IP misconfiguration 
inevitably decreases system operation and reliability. 
Besides, smart meters are deployed in smart grid as 
access points for each customer (in the NAN and 
HAN), in order to manage utility consumption. These 
devices are usually connected to the Internet through 
the metering gateway. In addition to IP spoofing, the 
gateway (both local and global), can become perfect 
points for intrusions, DoS attacks, and other Internet-
based attacks. 
Furthermore, per their design, utility consumers usually 
interact with the metering system through the web 
and/or mobile application interfaces. Most of these 
applications are either web-based or stand-alone. Web-
based applications are integrated with the metering 
system application using application programming 
interface (API). An unpatched API may be susceptible 
to various attacks exposing the entire metering system 
to malicious attacks. Moreover, a poorly configured 
interface design may expose the smart metering system 
to injection and code execution attacks. In the Home 
Area Network (HAN), such attacks on a metering 
device could destabilize the communication system 
leading to a denial of essential services to 
interdependent devices. In the Neighborhood Area 
Network (NAN), such an attack could lead to 
distributed denial of service attacks due to inter-meter 
communications.  
Many of these systems are designed with security in 
mind, however, security misconfiguration can occur at 
any level and in any part of the application. This could 
make the system vulnerable to software 
misconfiguration attack. At the firmware level, smart 
metering components usually have internal memory 
used for temporary storage and information processing. 
Like a conventional metering system, power 
fluctuations in the grid occasionally cause devices to 
lose memory leading to data loss. Furthermore, 
intermittent power fluctuations in semiconductor 
devices may lead to signal loss and potential system 
malfunction. Other security challenges in the smart 
metering infrastructure include component 
incompatibility, as well as device-based (physical) 
attacks, such as natural disasters, illegitimate use of the 
device (e.g. pilferage), and masquerading. To overcome 
these challenges will require innovative research and 
comprehensive system solutions which focus on the 
architectural redesign, firmware and hardware 
reconfiguration, network hardening and dynamic 
system application design.  
4.1 Smart Metering Cyber attack 
From the above challenges, we present a taxonomy of 
cybersecurity attacks in a smart metering 
communication system by analyzing system’s 
vulnerabilities vis-à-vis potential threat actors. In this 
taxonomy, six types of vulnerabilities are discussed. 
These are IP misconfiguration, injection, DoS, Code 
execution, Memory corruption, and XSS & CSRF. 
Corresponding threat vectors include physical (device) 
attack, application (software) attack, network attack, 
web interface attack, and data attack (see table 1 and 
figure 2). Table 1 shows our proposed vulnerability 
threat matrix. In columns III and IV, threat vectors are 
matched with their corresponding vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 2: Smart metering and corresponding threat attack 
Table 1: Vulnerability-Threat Matrix 
Vulnerabilities (V) 
Cyber-attack 
vectors (AV) 
Vulnerability-Threat 
Matrix 
Attack 
Vectors 
Vulnerabilities 
IP Misconfiguration 
(IM) 
Device Attack 
(DA) 
DA IP, MC, CE, D 
SQL Injection (SI) Application 
Attack (AA) 
AA SI, D, CE 
DoS (D) Network 
Attack (NA) 
NA SI, D, CE 
Code Execution 
(DE) 
Web Interface 
Attack (WiA) 
WiA SI, D, XC, IP 
XSS & CSRF (XC) 
Data Integrity 
Attack (DA) 
DA SI, CE Memory Corruption 
(MC) 
 
4.2 Attack Vectors 
4.2.1 Device Attack  
This is an attack type capable of compromising smart 
metering devices. It is the first point of call to 
compromise the functionality of the entire architecture 
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(depending on the devices involved). In a HAN, this 
type of attack could bring entire network down 
(especially when the metering unit is the point of 
attack). Similarly, in a NAN, a device attack may affect 
the resistance of the network which in the extreme case 
may lead to distributed denial of service attacks on the 
entire grid. Device attacks may be caused by IP 
misconfiguration, memory corruption, and wrongly 
executed code in the device operating system at the 
middleware layer. 
4.2.2 Application Service Attack 
This is a type of attack that compromises system 
applications (Web, Mobile, System, etc) which are run 
on various components of the system. Smart metering 
systems run multiple applications both at the local and 
the server levels. In most cases, these applications are 
owned by application service providers (ASPs) which 
are third party vendors. Cyber attacks on these 
applications will surely compromise the metering 
system. Common vulnerabilities in this type of attack 
include SQL injection, code execution, and DoS. 
4.2.3 Network Attack 
This is an attack which aims at compromising 
intercommunication among devices by either delaying 
message forwarding or completely failing to deliver. 
Network attacks may also destruct computational 
processes within the smart metering system. In a HAN, 
this type of attack aims at destructing the functionalities 
of the metering system. Similarly, in a NAN, a network 
attack may isolate or deny NAN devices from accessing 
vital information from the neighborhood or addressing 
messaging request from neighboring devices. Causes of 
network availability attacks include SQL injection, DoS 
and code execution in the network infrastructure 
system. 
4.2.4 Web Interface Attack 
This type of attack presents itself as a result of account 
enumeration, lack of account lockout or weak account 
credentials. In this case, an attacker may use weak 
account credentials (either capture plain-text credentials 
or enumerate accounts) to access the web interface. 
Web interface attacks may be caused by cross-site 
scripting (XSS), cross-site reference forgery (CSRF), IP 
misconfiguration and SQL injection. Other sources 
include insecure web interface design and weak account 
credentials. The attack compromises device integrity 
and could lead to denial of services.   
4.2.5 Data Integrity Attack 
This is an attack whereby the threat agent attempts to 
compromise system data by inserting, altering or 
completely deleting data (either stored or in 
transmission) so as to deceive smart metering to make 
wrong decisions or compromise its integrity. Data 
attacks may be caused by SQL injection and code 
execution which may be executed by a remote attacker. 
4.3 Experimental Evaluation of Cyberattacks 
against Smart Metering (SQLi and DoS 
Attack) 
In this section, we demonstrate how SQL injection and 
DoS attacks could be executed against a smart metering 
system. These demonstrations were performed on a live 
server with positive results. In each case, the results 
show that cyberattack on smart metering systems was 
successful. 
 
SQL injection attack – Algorithm 
Print header information 
   for URL in target URLs 
      for payload in get request payloads 
        response = send get request probe to server 
 if response.status code == 500  
    print payload and exist for manual attack 
      for paylaod in post request payloads 
        response = send post request probe to server  
  
 
Figure 3: SQL injection attack – Flowchart 
SQL injection attack – Python script 
This function delivers a payload to the server using the 
http ‘get’ method. To do this, the payload is added to 
the url. The url sends the request to @params payload 
{string}. The request parameters for example  
requests.get('http://www.test.com/', params=payload) 
will map to http://www.test.com/?key=value 
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### 
def http_get(url, payload): 
    r = requests.get(url, params=payload) 
    return process_responds(r) 
### 
This function processes the request to determine if the 
probe is positive or negative 
Probing Get (assuming query is contracted: where id = 
<defined_param> 
('Params ', {'make': "'"}) 
('Url: ',  
'http://metering.grid.com/metering/meter/topup_history'
) 
  data been sanitised 
  data been sanitised 
  data been sanitised 
  data been sanitised 
Probbing Post 
  data been sanitised 
  data been sanitised 
  data been sanitised 
  data been sanitised 
Vulnerability: Weakness found (SQL injection) 
Threat: data sanitised 
Effect: sensitive information could be disclosed by 
injection attack  
Impact: Data confidentiality and integrity could be 
compromised 
Denial of Service Attack 
DoS attack on the Application layer 
Attack url:  
http://metering.smartmeter.com/metering/server/dashbo
ard 
Tool: loadtest 
(https://www.npmjs.com/package/loadtest) requires 
nodejs to be installed 
Test parameter: $ loadtest 
http://metering.aborsour.com/metering/server/dashboar
d -t 50 -c 10 --rps 1000.  
 
Figure 4: Results (screenshot) of DoS attack 
5.0 Discussion  
The idea of running both SQLi and DoS attacks on a 
smart metering system highlights their significant 
impact on distributed network system, such as smart 
metering (see table 1). In the case of the former, a 
payload request was sent to the server to probe the 
server for vulnerabilities. The server responded with an 
ACKnowledgement a message header which 
encourages an attack on the system. This means, SQL 
injection vulnerability in a smart metering system could 
allow remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary 
SQL commands via crafted serialized data both on the 
metering information system server (MISS in figure 2). 
For example, SQL injection vulnerability in the login 
page in the user interface device would allow remote 
attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via a 
crafted URL. 
Per the CVE
1
 database, DoS vulnerability remains the 
most common vulnerability type and can be exploited 
by various threat vectors. In the above test, we executed 
multiple (abnormal) remote requests (1000) to the 
server from concurrent connections in 50 seconds. The 
result (figure 4) shows the server failing or executing 
arbitrary code (crushing). For example, a buffer 
overflow in the Point-to-Point Protocol over the 
Ethernet (PPPoE) module in the customer gateway 
when CHAP authentication is configured on the 
server, could allow remote attackers to cause a 
denial of service or execute arbitrary code via 
crafted packets sent during authentication. For 
                                                 
1 Common Vulnerability Exposure 
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instance, in CVE-2016-8666, an IP stack in the 
Linux kernel (before 4.6) allows remote attackers to 
cause a denial of service (stack consumption and panic) 
or possibly have an unspecified impact by triggering 
use of the GRO functions (gro-receive and gro-
complete) path for packets with tunnel stacking.  
6.0 Conclusion 
The core objective of smart grid is to improve 
efficiency and availability of power by adding more 
monitoring and control capabilities [16]. This objective 
is made plausible by the successful integration of a 
smart metering system for which which core value is to 
automate monitoring of consumer power consumption, 
efficient energy distribution, billing and accounting. In 
this paper, an attempt has been made to evaluate the 
taxonomy of the system inherent vulnerabilities which 
expose smart metering to various cyber threat vectors, 
and make case for research effort in this emerging 
technology. The discussion involved the identification 
of various vulnerabilities inherent within smart 
metering components matched with the potential threat 
vectors capable of exploiting these vulnerabilities. We 
executed two different attack scenarios (tests) as a proof 
of concept. Tests results show that vulnerable smart 
metering system could be abused by various threat 
actors via crafted vectors.  
Finally, it is critical to continue the discussion while at 
the same time challenging device manufacturers and 
components’ vendors to design, and implement 
solutions for such mechanisms so as to counteract 
threats from cyber adversaries of electrical grid so as to 
guarantee consumer utmost trust in a smart metering 
innovation and transformation. 
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